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Abstract
We simulate a job application/hiring market in the lab to examine racial discrimination. We find
little evidence of ability differences based on race but we find taste-based racism between groups
and statistical racism within groups. When candidates are given the opportunity to lie about
their abilities, all groups discriminate against Blacks, suggesting statistical discrimination. But
Whites continue to discriminate against Blacks when actual abilities of the candidate are known,
suggesting taste-based discrimination. In contrast to the bulk of studies that attempt to establish
racism in general as either a taste-based or statistical, our design allows us to show that the type
of discrimination can depend on the personal characteristics of the discriminating individual along
with the contextual information available.
1 Introduction
Despite efforts taken to eliminate legal forms of discrimination, racial inequality remains an enduring
problem in the 21st century. In the United States, for example, median yearly earnings of African
American males are 25 percent lower than those of their White counterparts and 22.6 percent less
of them are employed compared to Whites (BLS 2014). Recently, tensions have transformed into
violence and protest in the American Midwest amidst claims of institutionalized racism, police
mistreatment, and a related lack of opportunity for African Americans (Apel 2014). These current
trends attest to the need for economic research on discrimination.
To help our understanding of discrimination, we create a simulated labor market with univer-
sity students in a racially diverse area of the American Midwest. Subjects perform a task and
choose/hire teammates based on a variety of characteristics such as pictures of individuals, stated
task performance and real task performance. After these treatments, subjects choose partners
based on a combination of stated performance and a photograph followed by the final treatment of
real performance and a photograph. Using these treatments allows us to identify if racism exists
whenever race is salient and whether it remains even when the actual ability of the candidate is
known. The design is unique in that it allows us to identify racism within groups and across groups
and allows us to avoid deception in fieldwork.
The experiment provides us with some important and consequential findings. Racism of Whites
against Blacks is wholly taste-based and exists during all treatments where race is salient. We
find that internalized discrimination is statistical and occurs only when individuals see stated
performance versus real performance. Part of the observed discrimination occurs because both
Blacks and Whites expect Blacks to lie more than Whites, while in fact they are more honest
in our laboratory setting. This internalized racism by the discriminated group is removed with
information about actual abilities. In contrast, discrimination of Whites against Blacks does not
disappear when information on abilities is known. This suggests that discrimination is not simply
a result of incomplete information for this group.
Studies on discrimination have been undertaken in economics for a significant period of time.
The earliest studies questioned when, where, and if discrimination existed and discerned its impact
on labor markets through the use of historical datasets (Fawcett 1892, Edgeworth 1922, Bergmann
1971). More recently, a move toward simulated labor markets produced robust findings which
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matched those of earlier studies – that discrimination exerts a significant impact on hiring practices
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, Riach and Rich 2006, Rubinstein and Brenner 2013). Further
experimental studies have found that discrimination is often implicit – unconscious– as opposed to
being overt (Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan 2005). Although they have provided important
and interesting results, such field experiments have been criticized for employing deception within
real labor markets (Riach and Rich 2004). This ethical problem is avoided in the method of our
study, since a laboratory-based labor market simulation is used in lieu of an actual labor market
intervention.
Leaving the question of whether or not discrimination exists and if it matters relatively resolved,
foundational studies by Becker (1971,2010) and Arrow (1973) moved away from the question of if
discrimination exists, to why discrimination exists . Becker’s argument was that discrimination was
a taste-based phenomenon. In this view, people simply have a taste or distaste for other people
depending on whether these others fall into particular racial, gender or other categories. Arrow, on
the other hand, theorized discrimination as a statistical phenomenon - arguing that, in the absence
of information about the abilities or trustworthiness of others, people tend to discriminate based
on observable traits. This is a product of statistical assumptions that may be true of the affiliated
group on average, but possibly not true of the individual in question.
Much of the recent work on discrimination has contributed to this debate. This work has
helped the discussion to move away from either/or arguments about whether discrimination is taste-
based or statistical, to a more nuanced focus on when and where discrimination may be animated
from either of these sources. Castillo and Petrie (2010), for example, find evidence of statistical
discrimination in a laboratory experiment regarding cooperation in the provision of public goods.
In a later experiment, however, they find that statistical discrimination exists regarding race,
but is taste-based regarding beauty (Castillo, Petrie and Torero 2012). Gneezy, List, and Price
(2012) have expanded this investigation in a number of field experiments, finding that whether
discrimination is statistical or taste-based is dependent of whether or not the discriminator believes
the discriminated-against trait, such as race, gender, sexuality, or disability to be due to choice or
not - with statistical discrimination prominent in the former instance, and taste-based in the latter.
Rich (2014) conducted a meta-analysis of such studies finding that discrimination was statistical
mainly in product markets and taste-based elsewhere .
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We have good reason to expect to find statistical racism against Blacks in our study. There is
a widely publicized performance gap between Blacks and Whites on mental and academic tasks in
American society. This has been noted in terms of SAT scores (Card and Rothstein 2007, Fleming
2002), high school (Fletcher and Tienda 2015), and post-secondary performance (Men n.d.). In all
of these cases, Blacks tend to perform worse than Whites. Assuming that participants are aware
of these widely known performance gaps, we would expect to find a discrimination against the
hiring of Black participants and for this to be driven by a lack of information on the part of the
“employer” as to the actual competence of the field of potential candidates.
Researchers have recently begun to criticize studies on racism for not exploring important issues
beyond the taste-based vs. statistical discrimination debate. Particularly, it has been pointed out
that not enough attention has been paid to internalized racism, or self-racism the process by which
individuals come to discriminate against members of their own group and the ways in which racist
assertions are believed by those who are the targets of discrimination (Hoff and Stiglitz 2010, Bell,
Berry, Marquardt and Galvin Green 2013). Our study attempts to identify and distinguish between
the different forms of racism by using different information treatments in a laboratory setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the experiment design,
which was designed to have subjects on both sides of the labor market. In section 3, we provide a
brief summary of the subjects participating in the experiment and how session participants were
rated externally by a sample from a separate population. Section 4, briefly describes that there were
no significant racial differences in regards to performance and grade point average. In section 5,
we discuss the observed signaling/lying behavior observed in the stated score treatment. In section
6 we discuss the most interesting results shown by this experiment design, the hiring choices and
discrimination that occurs across different treatments. This is followed by our conclusion where we
discuss the meaning of these findings and potential future directions based on our findings.
2 Experiment Design
We simulate a job-market in which participants are able to “hire” and “be hired” based on in-
formation that is varied across seven distinct rounds. The design of the experiment allows us to
measure the extent of inter-group discrimination, internalized discrimination and whether these are
statistical or taste-based. The experiment was designed to provide information on both sides of a
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labor market: the candidate or labor supplier, and the employer or labor demander. Individuals
were paired into teams/firms based on a variety of information treatments that were used to signal
the quality of potential candidates as related to other individuals participating in each session.
To simulate the job application process, in one of the treatments subjects had the opportunity to
state their performance on a previous round of the task. This treatment was designed to provide
subjects to lie or inflate their performance to potential employers– this is a practice observed in the
evaluation of many resumes by HR professionals where candidates lie or inflate past job experiences
or performance (George and Marett 2004).1
2.1 Experiment Task
Subjects performed the task in a computer lab on desktop machines with privacy blockers to
maintain anonymity regarding their choices. A total of seven two minute rounds were performed
where subjects had a two minute time limit to solve as many word anagrams as possible. The
anagrams consisted of four to six scrambled letters.2 Sometimes the letters could create more than
one word. For example, the following letters have multiple solutions:
P S A E H
Possible correct solutions:
SHAPE
PHASE
If an answer was provided subjects then moved on to the next anagram and their responses
were graded as being correct so long as the word existed in the English language. In each round,
task performance was measured as the number of anagrams solved.
After each round subjects were asked a series of questions regarding their beliefs about theirs
and other’s performance. These questions included the number of anagrams they believed they
solved correctly; the group average, the number of anagrams solved by the best person in the group
and the number they believed their partner/teammate solved correctly. To ensure that subjects
had an incentive to answer accurately they received the equivalent of the piece rate for each belief
question they answered accurately if that round was chosen.
1As a recent example see former CEO of Yahoo! (Scott Thompson) who resigned in 2012 for lying on his resume.
2The letters came from words that are among the 3,000 most common words used in American magazines and
newspapers.
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Upon completion of the job market simulation task subjects performed a risk aversion task
similar to the one used in Holt and Laury (2002). This was done in part to examine whether risk
aversion plays a role in the inflation of stated performance. This was followed with an exit survey
that asked a variety of demographic questions as well as some subjective belief questions.
2.2 Payments and Treatments
The first round was a a practice round for which subjects were to get acquainted with the task.
After the practice round subjects were informed that six rounds would follow and that one of the
six rounds would be randomly chosen to be used for payment. The second round paid subjects a
piece rate of $0.5 for each anagram solved. The other rounds involved selecting teammates and
team competitions for which subjects were paid for performance on a relative scale and three of
the selection and competition rounds were randomized. The rounds were as follows:
1. Practice with no payment.
2. Piece-rate: paid a piece rate for each anagram solved.
3. (Randomized) Team competition: choose a teammate based on picture.
4. (Randomized) Team competition: choose a teammate based on a list of Round 2 performance.
5. (Randomized) Team competition: choose a teammate based on stated score.
6. Team competition: choose a teammate based on picture and stated score.
7. Team competition: choose a teammate based on picture and real performance.
After each round subjects were asked a series of belief questions for which they were paid for if
they were accurate. Subjects also received feedback about their own performance after the practice
round and the piece rate round. For the team competition rounds feedback was not provided until
the end of the experiment session. This was to ensure that knowledge about the team’s performance
did not lead to individuals altering choice behavior in subsequent rounds.
2.2.1 Payouts: Selection and Team/Firm Competition
The team competitions involved two parts for which subjects were paid. First, each participant
was rewarded for being chosen as a teammate by someone else in the session by receiving a flat
rate of $4 for each time they were chosen. Thus, there was a strong incentive to be chosen as a
teammate by subjects. This was to simulate the job application process where candidates apply
for positions at first by sending out a resume (or CV). Candidates in each round could be chosen
by multiple parties, which is akin to getting multiple job interviews.
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The payout for being chosen as a candidate is the prize of $4 multiplied by the number of
individuals in the group that choose that candidate. If we define I as the number of times a
candidate is selected then 0 ≤ I ≤ n− 1 where n is the number of session participants. The payout
for being selected as a candidate in a session is shown in Equation 2.1 which provides one part of
the payout for the experiment.
Payoutselect = I × $4 (2.1)
Each participant had the opportunity to choose a teammate to pair with for the team (firm)
competition. The team competition rewarded the individuals choosing their teammate with a dollar
value that was based on relative ranking of their team’s performance for that given round within
the session. The payout formula is shown in Equation 2.2, which shows that payouts depended on
session size (n) and an individual’s team rank within the session. As an example, if a session had
a total of four individuals participating then the top ranked team would receive $16, the second
would receive $8, the third would receive $4 and the fourth ranked team would receive $2.3
Payoutcomp = n× $8× 0.5rank (2.2)
It is important to note that individuals never had the opportunity to choose themselves; conse-
quently it was in each subject’s best interest to choose the best possible candidate. The chosen
candidate did not receive any payouts from the team beyond the flat rate of $4 for being chosen.
In theory, if all subjects have accurate information concerning potential candidates’ abilities then
they would all choose the best candidate as a teammate and the team competitions would depend
on just each individual’s performance while at the same time one candidate would be handsomely
rewarded for being chosen multiple times by all the possible teams.
The experiment was designed to provide subjects with incentives towards two goals. Each
subject has an incentive to be chosen as a teammate by as many other subjects as possible, the flat
rate payment for being selected provides this incentive. As well each individual has an incentive
to choose the best possible candidate for her or his team which would provide them with the best
chance in getting a higher ranking in the team versus team competitions that occur in each of these
team competition rounds. Thus, the total payout for the labor market portion of the experiment
consists of one randomly chosen round and is the sum of Payoutselect and Payoutcomp.
3In the event of a tie a random draw determined the ranking among the tied teams.
6
In selecting candidates, three distinct randomized (by session) information treatments were
used: a picture, real performance from the piece rate round, and stated performance which can be
thought of as a lie or noisy signal of quality. These three random treatments were followed by two
other information treatments: the next treatment used the stated performance posted next to the
candidate’s photograph, which was then followed by the candidate’s real score posted next to the
candidate’s photograph.4 Thus, any signaling in the stated score round was limited to one round
to limit the strategic set of options. A potential optimal strategy for candidates is to send a signal
to be chosen by as many session members as possible and to choose the best possible candidate
available. Also, given that the team competition was not a winner-take-all competition, there is an
incentive to always solve as many anagrams as possible to improve a subject’s relative ranking.
2.2.2 Information Treatments
Picture Treatment: Prior to the experiment session, portrait photographs were taken of subjects.
These pictures were used to make racial differences salient without explicitly stating that the picture
was designed to explore racial discrimination. In one of the randomized treatments, photographs
of all the individuals (other than the subject choosing) in the session were presented on subjects’
computer screens. Subjects then selected one picture for that individual to be part of their team
for that round. In this picture treatment no information was provided regarding actual or stated
scores.
Real Performance Treatment: In the real performance treatment a list of actual scores was provided
on each subject’s computer screen with a button to make a selection. These real scores came from
the piece rate round and all subjects were informed as to the source of these performance scores.
Stated Performance Treatment: Subjects were informed that they get to state their performance
and that other subjects will choose teammates based on their stated scores. Subjects were also
informed that they will be picking partners based on others’ stated scores.5
There were seven total rounds in each experiment session where rounds three to five were infor-
mation treatments that were provided in random order for different sessions. This randomization
is necessary because one of the treatments allows subjects to state their performance from the
piece rate round as opposed to just having it reported accurately and automatically by the soft-
4Real scores and stated scores with photographs were the same as were used in previous rounds so as not to allow
candidates to alter behavior or signals.
5See a copy of experiment instructions in Appendices.
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ware application. Thus, some subjects had the opportunity to see everyone’s real performance in
the session prior to the stated score round, they had better information about the distribution of
abilities than individuals who did not see real performance before the stated score round. Given
that there is no truth-telling incentive or constraint in this experiment, individuals see little to no
cost from lying in regards to their statements regarding past performance.
Picture + Stated and Picture + Real Treatments: The final two rounds were designed to test
whether choices made in the earlier treatments remained consistent when stated performance and
real performance information was provided with the pictures of the individuals. These final treat-
ments were not randomized given that individuals could identify actual performance if the picture
plus real performance was ever shown first. Therefore, the last round to be shown was the picture
along with the real performance. The real performance was based on the original piece rate round
and the stated performance came from the round where individuals stated their performance. This
comparison of stated and real performance with the pictures of subjects provides us with the ability
to compare the consistency of teammate/partner choices when multiple pieces of information are
provided to subjects as part of their screening process.
3 Subjects and Sessions
Subjects were paid a $5 payment for participating in the experiment and earnings they made from
the experiment were then added to this participation payment. Along with the Job Market/Team
Competition experiment, subjects were also paid for a risk aversion. The experiment took between
fifty to seventy minutes to complete. A total of 115 subjects participated in the study and on
average subjects were paid $24.01.
A total of nineteen sessions were run with session sizes ranging from three to nine subjects with
an average session size of six subjects.6 Given that the experiment was focused on race, the racial
composition of subjects session groups is important. Subjects were from a public state university
in the Mid-West United States with a student population of approximately 23,400 students. The
university population the sample was drawn from is approximately 63% White and 57% female.7
In using (not mutually exclusive) self-reports for race the we find the subject pool was 64% White,
6We control for session size in payouts and analyses and find the race effect remains consistent.
7Population data is from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for the approximate time the study
took place (2011-2012).
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27% Black, and 12% Asian. Sessions were racially diverse as only one session contained only White
subjects and one session contained all non-White subjects.8
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the subjects who participated in the study. The
subjects are representative of the university population which has a larger percentage of Black
individuals than the national average of 12% for public 4-year institutions in the United States
(National Center for Education Statistics, Fall 2013). Demographic data was collected using a
self-reported survey which took place in sessions after the experiment tasks were complete. One
question asked whether subjects had previously felt disadvantaged because of their race: we consider
this to be self-reported discrimination.9 Table 1 shows that 25% of subjects believed that they
had previously been discriminated against. Thus, not only is the set of subjects in the study fairly
racially diverse, but a significant portion of them believe they had experienced racial discrimination
in the past.
[Table 1 about here.]
In Section 2 it was explained that in some of the treatments subjects chose partners based on
photographs presented to them of other people in the session. To measure physical attributes that
may impact the choice of partners, the pictures were rated by an external group of individuals
using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each individual was rated on a whole number scale between
one and seven by fifty-four individuals across a number of attributes including: attractiveness,
generosity, honesty, and intellectual ability. The goal of these ratings was to provide a measure of
physical characteristics which may influence subjects’ selections of partners. The values used as
control variables were averaged across all the individuals who rated each subject’s picture. Even
by averaging we see from Table 1 that there was a great deal of heterogeneity between subjects
across all the characteristics that were rated.
Along with physical attributes that are observed in the photographs, the possibility exists that
subjects may have known each other from previous interactions. Consequently, subjects who are
close to each other socially may choose each other due to the potential payment each individual
receives if they are chosen. To control for this form of favoritism, subjects were asked to rate (on
a one to seven scale) photographs of each other upon completion of the experiment– after they
8The probability of these same race sessions occurring based on population statistics was 7% and 5% respectively.
Thus, a priori we would expect that one session of each would occur based on the total number of sessions and session
sizes used for the study.
9The wording was: have you experienced disadvantages in the last two years because of your race?
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had been assured of their payout amounts.10 A rating of seven meant that a subject considered
themselves as socially distant from each other while a rating of one meant that subjects knew
each other very well. The Closeness statistic summarizes these social distance measures. We
find that most subjects did not know each other well, because 88% of closeness measures were 7.
Approximately 95% of subjects rated each other as 5 or higher, which suggests that few subjects
knew others really well, but given the potential influence of previous social ties we are able to
control for any favoritism based on subjects previous social proximity using this closeness measure.
4 No Race Differences: Performance and GPA
The word anagram task was fairly race neutral in terms of performance. Blacks had a mean
performance score of 9.24 and a median score of 9.00 across all rounds. Non-Black participants
had a mean score of 9.55 and a median score of 9.00. Learning did occur across the rounds but we
control for these learning effects in regressions in Table 2.
In Table 2 we use random effects panel regressions to estimate performance scores while con-
trolling for a number of other factors including age, race, gender, and learning. We find that GPA
and learning are significant predictors of performance. We also find that risk aversion is negatively
correlated with performance.11 Other than the sample of Asian subjects (12% of subjects), we find
little evidence of differences in performance based on gender or race.
[Table 2 about here.]
We also find little difference between the grade point average (GPA) of subjects based on race.
Table 3 shows that the GPA of Blacks is lower, but we find the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (p-value=.227) between subjects participating in the this study. Given the insignificant
differences based on race regarding performance and GPA there is little incentive to discriminate
based on race when choosing teammates; in other words, there should be no statistical discrimina-
tion based on race for this task.
[Table 3 about here.]
10The wording was: It is possible that you have had some personal interactions with some of the people in this
session. To take this into account, the researchers would like you to indicate your social closeness with each of the
individuals in the pictures below. A rating of 1 means you are very close to the individual. A rating of 7 means you
are very distant from that individual.
11We believe this may occur because those subjects are less likely to guess.
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5 Signaling or Lies
When given an opportunity to lie about one’s score, optimizing behavior would dictate an inflation
(or potentially deflation) of reported scores– a lie akin to the “padding” of a resume.12 We observe
that lying in general is amplified with knowledge of information about the abilities of competitors.
A potential reason for this behavior is that participants may not lie until they have an idea of
their actual performance relative to others. Then the stated/lie score falls within the range of a
believable signal. Based on our examination of the signals candidates send, we find that without
information regarding the distribution, subjects send a signal not significantly different from their
beliefs of the best score. Once the distribution of scores is known individuals send signals similar
to the known best scores.
5.0.3 Observed Strategies for Stated Scores
Before stating scores, each subject formed a prior belief about the distribution of scores. If the
real scores have been shown prior to having the opportunity to provide a stated (lie) score then
all subjects have the same information set and similar beliefs about the distribution of scores.
We assume that subjects desire to be chosen due to the payoff of being selected. Therefore, they
should send a signal that leads to them being chosen as frequently as possible. For simplicity, we
assume that subjects who send an equal and optimal signal are chosen randomly. In this one-round
signal sending game a potential strategy is to send a signal that makes an individual look like the
best performer in the group without seeming like an outlier which would make the signal seem
unbelievable.
To consider behavior in this stated score round, assume that individuals all have the same
information set concerning everyone’s performance (assume they see the list of real scores first).
Then a believable signal can only consist of a signal that is less than or equal to the highest real
score (r) and greater than or equal to the lowest score (r). Then individual i must choose a signal
si ∈ [r, r]. Given that there are no repeated rounds of signaling and no verification it is a likely
strategy to send a signal si = r. There are two possible situations regarding signaling behavior in
the stated score round. First, all other candidates (j such that j 6= i) send a signal sj = r, then
the probability that an individual gets picked is random with a probability equal to 1n−1 . Given
12Feltovich et al. (2002) show that deflation of scores could be reasonable in certain situations.
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that n− 1 individuals are picking, this leads to an expected payoff of being chosen once and each
individual receives an expected value of $4. A second possibility is that at least one individual j
sends signal sj 6= r. Then it maybe the case that people that choose candidates disregard the signal
because it is less than or greater than r and all individuals that sent signals equal to r have an
improved probability of being chosen. Or it may be the case that individuals believe the candidate
is sophisticated and is sending a signal to differentiate themselves from others. For this strategy to
be worthwhile there must be more than one individual that would choose the candidate or else the
individual would be no better off than sending a signal equal to r.13
There are numerous possibilities regarding signals being sent and the support depends on beliefs.
The reason we use this format of signal sending without verification is because it is found that
resume lies and inflation are fairly common (George and Marett 2004). Often lies, omissions,
inflated statements go unnoticed or may even take years to identify. In the experiment, participants
have an incentive to lie by inflating their scores to a degree by which they might be chosen as a
partner, but not to such a degree that others would suspect them of lying– leading to a choice not
to select the individual in question.
Awareness of other people’s scores by having the real score round come before the stated score
round, was revealed to be important. On average, participants were found to lie more once they
were aware of the real scores of others in the group. Thus, access to information about the scores of
competitors caused more deception. On average the stated score was 0.13 higher than the observed
best score, which was not significantly different from zero. For individuals who did not know the
best score, we compared individual’s stated scores to their beliefs of the best score in the previous
round. We found that these individuals stated scores were on average 0.46 less than their beliefs
of the best score and this is was not significantly different than zero.
A number of factors affect lying to “employers.” In our experiment, we still find a certain degree
of variability away from the mean behavior. Table 4 provides linear regression estimates for the
stated (Lie) scores of individuals. The Table shows that Black subjects, especially Black males,
are more likely to state lower scores than others. This remains true even when controlling for the
Real Score. The impact of real scores (from the real score round) is significant.14 Once we include
13If everyone believes that a signal not equal to r suggests sophistication and an actual signal of quality is disregarded
then a babbling equilibrium is possible (Sobel 2009). But based on observation, in our experiment these prior beliefs
seem unlikely to support this behavior.
14The significance of lying that takes place by Asian subjects seems to be mainly caused by them performing worse
than others.
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the beliefs of performance from the previous round then observing the real performance round is
no longer significant. Thus, individuals are updating their beliefs about performance and therefore
lying based on the most recent update as opposed to using the real performance from the piece
rate treatment.
[Table 4 about here.]
We find the Black subjects (especially males) tend to inflate scores less than others. Overall we
find that individuals lie or state scores that are based in part on their recent beliefs of their own
performance. This self belief is more important than other peoples scores or even actual scores in
shaping stated scores. But based on stated scores, if information was publicly available we would
expect no statistical discrimination when subjects stated scores with race being salient.
6 Hiring Choices and Discrimination
In each of the team competition rounds each subject has an opportunity to choose/hire a team-
mate/partner. We first examine the proportions chosen across a number of obvious characteristics
to examine if there are any general differences in choice behavior that coincide with the different
treatments. Table 5 has the proportion of subjects chosen according to the following characteristics
(in order of columns) Female, Black, White, Previously discriminated against because of race, Real
Score (from Round 2), Stated Score (from stated score treatment). Each row in the table is for the
labeled information treatment.
From Table 5 we observe that the proportion of individuals chosen by race seems to vary a great
deal based on the treatment. We observe that Black individuals are chosen less when a picture is
shown. Alternatively, the proportion of White subjects chosen is greatest during treatments that
show a picture and the proportion is highest when the photograph is shown with the real scores.
Subjects who have previously been discriminated against also are chosen less when their pictures
are part of the information set.15 Thus, the treatments exhibit some variation based on the choices
of individuals chosen/hired, but this variation seems to be based on race.
We would expect that treatments when real scores are shown would lead to those treatments
having the highest average real scores. Table 5 shows that average real scores are highest when
15We find that there is no difference in the attractiveness of subjects that have been discriminated against and
others.
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real scores are shown with pictures of individuals (13.79) and when just real scores are shown the
mean is slightly lower at 13.10.16 But both those treatments have significantly higher real scores
of individuals chosen than any of the other treatments. Meanwhile, both the single information
treatments of the picture and the stated score lead to selecting lower quality candidates. The final
column shows that the highest average stated score actually occurs when the picture is shown along
with the stated score and not when the stated score is the only information available for making a
choice. This difference suggests that subjects are not always choosing the highest stated score that
is presented to them. But the table suggests that real scores are positively related with the stated
scores as the means of real scores are high when the mean stated scores are high as well.
[Table 5 about here.]
In the picture round, the only information available consisted of the facial characteristics of
individuals. Subjects had to form beliefs of the abilities of these candidates from a very unrelated
source of information, but when making choices some logic must follow in making decisions.17
From a picture one can make subjective judgments on a person’s attractiveness, intelligence and
trustworthiness. To test whether subjects were choosing partners from the picture treatment based
on these types of judgments each photograph was rated externally across a number of characteristics.
We used external judgments to get a larger number of judgments on each individual, to limit
experiment session length and also to not have subjects feel judged within a live experiment session,
which could make them uneasy. Table 6 provides the average external ratings (on a one to seven
scale) of subjects chosen along with the mean GPA of chosen subjects. The characteristics that the
external judges were asked to measure include (in order of table columns) attractiveness, generosity,
honesty and intelligence. The table shows that all these dimensions are highest when individuals
had only the photographs to use to choose candidates. We also find that these subjective measures
of the photographs do not correlate with a measure of intellectual ability such as GPA.
[Table 6 about here.]
16A potential explanation for the real score average not being highest when that was the only information available
is that if a high score was an outliers it was not believed in earlier treatments.
17Eckel and Petrie (2011) find subjects value pictures prior to making choices in trust games.
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6.1 Testing for Discrimination
To test for racial discrimination, we examine the probability an individual is hired based on the
characteristics available in each treatment. To examine whether discrimination is statistical or
taste based we compare the hiring (partner selection) behavior of White subjects versus Non-White
subjects. We assume that if discrimination is statistical then we should observe discrimination in
the same direction by both groups. By having independent treatments where only a single piece
of information is available we are able to compare changes based on race and information context
once real scores and stated scores are combined with the photographs. We estimate probabilities
by estimating the marginal effects from probit regressions where the dependent variable is whether
a candidate was chosen/hired or not.
Table 7 compares the probabilities of individuals being hired in just the Picture treatment broken
down by the race of the individual who is hiring. The regressions are separated for individuals hiring
if they are White versus if they are Non-White.18 The size of sessions is also controlled for, but the
general, and intuitive result is that the larger the number of candidates in the session the less likely
an individual will be hired. When the individual making the choice was White we observe that an
individual is more likely to be hired/selected if they look to be more intelligent in the photograph
and if they are socially close (the closest an individual can be to someone is 1 and the furthest
they can be from someone is 7) to the individual that is hiring. Closeness is the only variable (not
including controls) that is significant in the same direction for the Non-White individuals selecting
partner.
In terms of discrimination, we find that if a White individual is hiring then a subject is more
likely to be hired if there is a larger proportion of Black individuals in the candidate pool: so long
as the candidate themselves is not Black. There is approximately a .12 lower probability of being
selected by a White individual if a subject is Black. We observe no such discrimination by the
Non-White population. Based on the picture treatment alone we observe racial discrimination by
White subjects when choosing a partner.
[Table 7 about here.]
Table 8, focuses on the Stated Score treatment. In this treatment individuals choose a score
to report as their performance to be posted alongside others from which people would potentially
18We get qualitatively equivalent results when classify hiring individuals as Black and Non-Black. White was
chosen on the hiring side to provide a more homogeneous racial population for the majority.
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choose them as a candidate. The table breaks down the probabilities of being hired by whether
the individual doing the hiring is White or Non-White.19 We find that these two groups respond
to the stated scores differently.
White individuals are more likely to select higher stated scores, but do so at a decreasing rate
as exhibited by the negative coefficient of the square of the stated score. Otherwise, they respond
to very little of the other information available such as the top stated score. Interestingly, if the
treatment using real scores was shown previously it has little impact on the selection of candidates
by White subjects. The same cannot be said of the Non-White subjects: when making selections
an individual is less likely to be hired if there is a high “Top Stated” score that does not belong to
them. Also, if a high real score was shown previously it lowers the probability of being selected by
a Non-White subject by at most 0.1. Without pictures we find that there is no discrimination by
either group in this treatment as no information about race is provided.
[Table 8 about here.]
Table 9 provides the probabilities from the Real Score treatment where subjects could choose/hire
partners from a list of real scores. The Table shows that both White and Non-White subjects made
candidate selections in a very similar manner. A candidate has a higher probability of being se-
lected the higher their real score is and a lower probability of being chosen the higher the top score
is in the session.
[Table 9 about here.]
The three separate single information treatments were all followed by the Stated Score and Pic-
ture treatment. Each individual’s previously stated score was listed next to their picture. In this
treatment we find that both White subjects and Non-White subjects discriminate against hir-
ing/selecting Black candidates. Figure 1 provides the estimated marginal effects for each group
based on the Stated (Lie) Score with the shaded region showing the standard errors across the
estimates. The figures show that a Black candidate is less likely to be chosen when they can be
identified as Black and they report a stated score.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Table 10 shows the marginal effects at the median for three different probit estimations. The
first column provides marginal effects for the entire subject pool, which shows that the stated score
19Using Black versus Non-Black provides us with qualitatively equivalent results.
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has an impact on selections as does the social closeness of the subjects with the individual choosing
partners. But the most striking result across all three estimations is that a Black candidate is less
likely to be selected regardless of the race of the individual doing the hiring. Interestingly, the two
groups respond differently to photographs specifically using the external measure of intelligence:
we find that White subjects are more likely to select individuals who look intelligent while the Non-
White subjects are less likely to do so. Overall, the result that both White and Non-White subjects
are less likely to choose Black candidates suggests that this type of discrimination is statistical.
Specifically the discrimination seems to be tied to a lack of trust towards Black subjects when they
can lie/inflate their reported performance. We discuss this possibility in our conclusion.
[Table 10 about here.]
In the final round, subjects choose partners based on real scores from the piece rate round which
were listed next to the pictures of individuals. We find support for taste based discrimination by
White subjects in this round. In general, we find that the real score plays a major factor in choosing
a partner from potential candidates. Figure 2 provides the cumulative probability of an individual
being hired based on real scores and it shows that discrimination against Black candidates is only
performed by White subjects. Table 11, which provides the marginal effects of a candidate being
hired at the median shows that discrimination is entirely performed by White subjects though it
shows up as significant in the estimations for the entire subject pool. This result suggests that
White subjects are using taste-based discrimination against Black candidates even when given
accurate performance information along with individual pictures. On the other hand, subjects that
are Non-White mainly choose candidates based on performance and social proximity–the closer the
individual, the more likely they are to be picked.
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Table 11 about here.]
7 Conclusion
Our experiment design allows us to distinguish important features relating to race and discrimina-
tion. We can discern the extent to which racism exists in our study based on different informational
contexts. This is achieved by comparing individual team selection choices based on changing in-
formation: with pictures only, past scores in a similar task only, and a combination of the two.
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This allows us also to determine the extent to which racial discrimination exists. We also observe
the impact of potential lies in quality signals by race categories and consequently observe a bias in
trusting signals from Blacks when selecting teammates. If this lack of trust of Black signals was
based on statistical discrimination we would expect it to disappear in both groups when controlling
for real performance scores when included with the picture. But this does not happen amongst
white subjects who continue to discriminate even when actual performance is available– providing
evidence of taste-based discrimination.
We find that internalized discrimination of Blacks is statistical and is based on a noisy signal
(incomplete information). We also find racism of Whites against Blacks is taste-based and persistent
across information treatments whenever race is salient. Some of this discrimination stems from a
lack of trust in Black signals. But Blacks lie less than Whites on average and both Non-Whites
and Whites expect Blacks to lie more than Whites in this study. The finding that Non-White
subjects are discriminating against Blacks is likely based on assumptions or prior beliefs and seems
to indicate a lack of trust of Black subjects even among themselves. In this case, the statistical
discrimination was inaccurate, but likely culturally and socially motivated. Information, in this
case, is a salve for discrimination and therefore a dissemination of non-race information should
diminish the extent to which this incorrectly formed statistical discrimination occurs.
Some of this bias against Blacks may be the result of race-based educational achievement
gaps, which remain pronounced across the globe, including in the United States(Singleton 2014,
Carnoy and Rothstein 2013). The enactment and funding of comprehensive educational attain-
ment programs– many of which have been advocated for by educational researchers– would likely
do much to diminish the statistical gap on which intra-group Black discrimination occurs. But with-
out changing the gap, this type of discrimination can be seen as being efficient in many respects
and may even be based on the racial performance gap shown in SAT scores.
The largest of the problems associated with discrimination is taste-based discrimination ema-
nating from the Whites in this study. Since taste-based discrimination is not informational, there
are limited policy choices available for counteracting this. One of the most obvious choices in
this regard would be the implementation of affirmative action policies requiring the hiring of a
minimum number of Black applicants as long as they are equally qualified as White applicants.
Taste-based discrimination is economically inefficient and in the absence of perfectly competitive
markets, which would compel discriminators to change their behaviors via threat of competition.
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Such affirmative action programs could, if designed correctly, improve profitability for businesses
whose hiring practices are controlled by Whites. Another solution for taste-based discrimination
is the transformation of these biases and/or tastes. But given the inability of good information
about abilities to remove taste-based discrimination, it suggests that these preferences are unfortu-
nately deeply rooted, therefore providing a valid case for the implementation of affirmative action
programs.
The findings regarding lying behaviors have important implications, especially regarding the
area of community political and economic development. It has long been understood that trust
is a primal component of social capital. And social capital, especially in communities, is essential
for smoothly running economies, political systems, and civil society groups(Putnam 2013). The
finding that Blacks tend to lie less in general can be thought of as a social capital asset. This asset
is most pronounced when Blacks are aware that others know their identities. The finding that
Blacks expect other Blacks to lie more, on the other hand, implies an erosion of social capital via
internalized discrimination. Finding the cause of this internalized bias has value because there is
value within the group to know who your neighbors are and currently, among this subject pool,
Black subjects are unnecessarily considered less trustworthy by other Black subjects.
The unique design of this study allowed us to identify both taste-based and statistical discrim-
ination amongst various groups. We find that Whites discriminate against Blacks regardless of
information suggesting taste-based discrimination and find that Non-Whites statistically discrim-
inate against Blacks based on what seem to be inaccurate beliefs about honesty. In general, the
forms of discrimination we find suggest a very serious problem. Not only is the issue of taste-based
discrimination a problem, but the fact that in-group discrimination has incorrectly manifested itself
in the controlled setting of the lab suggests that minority groups may be shouldering unnecessary
biases onto one another. Better information about actual abilities seems to be the best way to
make these biases irrelevant among discriminated groups.
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Appendices
Appendix A Experiment Instructions
In this experiment you will be performing a simple task for real money. The task will consist of
solving as many word anagrams as possible within X minutes. Before you begin a real session, you
will get one practice round so that you will understand how the task works.
The word anagrams will consist of 4 to 6 scrambled letters that can make a word that is among
the 3000 most common words in used in American newspapers or magazines. Sometimes the letters
can create more than one word. For example, the following letters:
P S A E H
This anagram can be solved correctly by submitting the word SHAPE or the word PHASE. Your
answer will be counted as being correct so long as you form an English word with the scrambled
letters. After you submit one word another set of letters will be shown to you. Your goal is to
solve as many anagrams as possible within the X minute time limit. You will not be penalized for
guessing or submitting incorrect words, but you will only be paid for correct words.
After the practice round, you will perform the task in six other rounds. One of the rounds will
be chosen for your experiment payment. Your payout will in part depend on how well you perform
in the task compared to others.
One of the six rounds will be used as part of your payout for the experiment. Please continue
to the practice round.
For RID 2 (Piece-Rate):
In this Round you will be paid Y dollars for each anagram you solve in X minutes if this round
is chosen as part of your experiment payout.
Your performance in this round may affect payouts in future rounds as other session members
may choose to have you on their team based on your performance. You will get a payment of Q
dollars in those rounds for each time you are chosen to be part of a team.
If this round is chosen as part of your experiment payout, then you will receive Y dollars
multiplied by the number of anagrams you solve in X minutes.
Press continue to begin the round.
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In the following rounds you will choose an individual in the session to be part of your group.
Your group will be competing against everyone elses group. Your group performance will consist
of your performance plus the performance of the individual you are paired with.
Your group performance will be compared to everyone elses group in this session. If this round
is chosen as part of your experiment payout then you the payouts based on group placement will
be as follows. 1st: $ 2nd: $ In the event of tie, the placement of tied groups will be determined
randomly.
Along with this group payment, you will also receive a payment of $ for each time you are
chosen to be part of someone elses group. The more times you are chosen, the more money you can
make. So if you are chosen by three people in this round then you will make another $. Therefore,
the more people that pick you, the more money you can earn.
For RID (Real Performance):
In this round, individuals in the session will choose partners based on the performance from
Round 2 (the piece rate round).
You want to pick your group member wisely to increase your chances of winning the group
competition.
Press continue to pick your partner.
For RID (Picture)“
In this round, individuals in the session will choose partners based on the pictures taken of you
prior to the experiment session.
You want to pick your group member wisely to increase your chances of winning the group
competition.
Press continue to pick your partner.
For RID (Stated Performance)
In this round, you will have the option of stating your performance in this task. Based on your
stated performance individuals will chose to have you as part of their team. The more people that
pick you as part of their team, the more money you will make. For example, if you are chosen by
three people in this round then you will make another $ if this round is chosen for your payout.
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You will also choose a partner for your group based on their stated performance. You want to
pick your group member wisely to increase your chances of winning the group competition.
Press continue to provide your stated performance.
You are free to state any performance you want. But you should remember that the goal is
to be chosen most often by people in the session. The more people that pick you as part of their
team, the more money you will make, $ for each time you are picked. If you are chosen by three
people in this round then you will make another $ if this round is chosen for your payout.
Submit your performance. Choose a partner from the list of stated performances.
For RID 6 (Stated Performance and Picture):
In this round you will choose a partner based on stated performance from the earlier round
and their picture. Likewise, individuals in the session will have the opportunity to choose you as a
group member based on your stated performance along with your picture.
If this round is chosen as part of your experiment payout then you will receive the group
competition payout along with $ for each time you are chosen by someone else.
You want to pick your group member wisely to increase your chances of winning the group
competition.
Continue to choose a partner from the list of session members. Choose a partner from the list
of session members
For RID 7 (Actual Performance and Picture): In this round you will choose a partner based
on their actual performance from the second round and their picture. Likewise, individuals in
the session will have the opportunity to choose you as a group member based on your actual
performance from round 2 along with your picture.
If this round is chosen as part of your experiment payout then you will receive the group
competition payout along with $ for each time you are chosen by someone else.
You want to pick your group member wisely to increase your chances of winning the group
competition.
Continue to choose a partner from the list of session members. Choose a partner from the list
of session members.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Female 0.54 0.5 0 1
White 0.64 0.48 0 1
Black 0.27 0.45 0 1
GPA 2.73 1.37 0 4
Age 25.33 7.7 18 56
Race Discrim.* 0.25 0.44 0 1
n 115
External Ratings of Pictures (scale 1-7)
Attractiveness 4.2 0.73 2.32 5.71
Generosity 4.43 0.61 2.94 5.43
Honesty 4.55 0.62 2.78 5.54
Intelligence 4.75 0.52 3.31 5.86
No. of Ratings 53.85 1.93 49 58
Closeness (n=611) 6.68 1.07 1 7
*=Self-report survey question on racial discrimination.
25
Table 2: Performance
(1) (2)
Score Score
GPA 0.89*** 0.86***
(0.295) (0.299)
Asian -5.02*** -4.92***
(1.222) (1.239)
Black -0.29 -0.81
(0.887) (1.303)
Female 0.66 0.41
(0.806) (0.930)
Black Fem. 0.98
(1.789)
Constant 5.98*** 6.21***
(1.934) (1.983)
Age, Learning and Risk Controls Yes Yes
Observations 805 805
Number of ID 115 115
r2 0.174 0.176
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: GPA Differences by Black
Group Obs GPA Mean
Not-Black 84 2.82
Black 31 2.47
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Table 4: Stated (Lie) Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lie Score Lie Score Lie Score Lie Score Lie Score Lie Score
Female 0.13 0.24 0.10 0.07 0.70 0.51
(1.566) (1.516) (1.034) (0.956) (1.106) (1.059)
Asian -6.05*** -6.14*** -2.16 -1.50 -1.71 -1.50
(1.594) (1.548) (1.403) (1.785) (1.411) (1.586)
Black -3.76* -5.66*** -3.24** -3.00** -3.21** -3.10**
(1.816) (1.881) (1.505) (1.336) (1.439) (1.373)
Black x Female 7.52 7.92 6.25 7.45 7.00 7.40
(4.658) (4.571) (4.720) (4.627) (4.337) (4.450)
Pic. prior -0.44 0.17 0.58 0.37 0.47 0.39
(1.592) (1.815) (1.239) (1.264) (1.259) (1.266)
Real prior 5.00** 3.28 2.88* 1.48 1.64 1.28
(1.857) (2.366) (1.535) (1.634) (1.549) (1.606)
Prop. Black 8.36* 6.61* 5.67 6.86* 6.29*
(4.232) (3.361) (3.442) (3.317) (3.296)
Real Score 0.75*** 0.50*** 0.26 0.28
(0.101) (0.167) (0.235) (0.222)
Prv. Belief Top 0.56** 0.29
(0.225) (0.182)
Prv. Belief Self 0.89*** 0.62**
(0.299) (0.223)
Constant 1.24 -3.48 -9.73* -13.28** -12.08** -13.24**
(4.975) (5.246) (4.866) (5.412) (4.503) (4.948)
Controls Size Size Size Size Size Size
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115
R-squared 0.294 0.316 0.482 0.546 0.558 0.568
r2 a 0.248 0.264 0.438 0.502 0.515 0.522
F 5.161 5.758 20.54 27.73 27.59 26.93
N clust 19 19 19 19 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Errors clustered on session
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Chosen Individuals
Treatment Fem Black White Race Disc. Real Stated
Picture 0.57 0.18 0.79 0.13 9.73 13.17
Real 0.57 0.23 0.76 0.19 13.10 16.53
Stated 0.56 0.26 0.69 0.23 9.25 14.76
Stated + Pic 0.56 0.17 0.78 0.11 11.21 16.79
Real + Pic 0.57 0.19 0.83 0.13 13.79 16.36
Total 0.56 0.21 0.77 0.16 11.42 15.52
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Table 6: Chosen External Ratings
Round GPA Attract. Gener. Honesty. Intel.
Picture 2.77 4.26 4.59 4.70 4.89
Real 2.77 4.02 4.43 4.54 4.70
Stated 2.92 4.23 4.50 4.62 4.79
Stated + Pic 2.98 4.20 4.46 4.55 4.78
Real + Pic 2.86 4.05 4.33 4.43 4.63
Total 2.86 4.15 4.46 4.57 4.76
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Table 7: Hiring By Picture
Marginal Effects of Being Hired By Picture Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hired by White Hired by Non-White
Marg. FX at Mean at Median at Mean at Median
Attractive. -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
(0.032) (0.039) (0.046) (0.045)
Intelligence 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.08 0.08
(0.048) (0.062) (0.072) (0.069)
Closeness -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.03** -0.03**
(0.017) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013)
Prop. Black 0.17** 0.20** 0.12* 0.11
(0.066) (0.091) (0.069) (0.078)
Cand. Black -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.05 -0.04
(0.042) (0.050) (0.071) (0.066)
Cand. Asian -0.08* -0.10 -0.08 -0.08
(0.047) (0.059) (0.085) (0.081)
Cand. Female 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.042) (0.049) (0.062) (0.062)
Controls Order Order Order Order
Controls Size Size Size Size
Observations 408 408 203 203
Xmfx y 0.154 0.213 0.184 0.176
N clust 74 74 40 40
ll -172.9 -172.9 -95.38 -95.38
chi2 76.07 76.07 112.3 112.3
r2 p 0.0981 0.0981 0.0533 0.0533
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Errors clustered on Individual (Employer/Selector)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Hiring By Stated Score
Hired By Stated Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hired by White Hired by Non-White
Marg. FX at Mean at Median at Mean at Median
Stated Score 1.89e-02*** 2.07e-02*** 1.92e-02** 1.62e-02**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Stated Score2 -3.14e-04*** -3.43e-04** -2.03e-04 -1.72e-04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Top Stated -8.55e-04 -9.34e-04 -4.70e-03*** -3.97e-03***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Cand. Black -2.01e-02 -2.16e-02 4.35e-02 3.89e-02
(0.048) (0.051) (0.066) (0.063)
Cand. Female 2.39e-02 2.50e-02 -4.75e-02 -4.41e-02
(0.039) (0.041) (0.054) (0.050)
Real Seen 2.89e-02* 3.29e-02 3.70e-02 3.37e-02
(0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026)
Real Seen x Top -6.16e-04 -6.73e-04 -3.04e-03** -2.57e-03*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Controls Order Order Order Order
Controls Size Size Size Size
Observations 414 414 212 212
Xmfx y 0.168 0.193 0.172 0.134
N clust 74 74 41 41
ll -186.3 -186.3 -96.68 -96.68
chi2 578.2 578.2 266.9 266.9
r2 p 0.0416 0.0416 0.0714 0.0714
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Errors clustered on Individual (Employer/Selector)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Hiring By Real Score
Hired By Real Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hired by White Hired by Non-White
Marg. FX at Mean at Median at Mean at Median
Real Score 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Best Public -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Cand. Black -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.032) (0.031) (0.071) (0.087)
Cand. Female -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.06
(0.035) (0.037) (0.056) (0.065)
Cand. Asian -0.04 -0.04 -0.11** -0.13*
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.075)
Controls Order Order Order Order
Controls Size Size Size Size
Observations 414 414 212 212
Xmfx y 0.121 0.126 0.153 0.212
N clust 74 74 41 41
ll -150.3 -150.3 -88.38 -88.38
chi2 73.79 73.79 127.8 127.8
r2 p 0.227 0.227 0.151 0.151
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Errors clustered on Individual (Employer/Selector)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Hiring By Picture + Stated Score
(1) (2) (3)
Hired Hired by White Hired by Non-White
Stated Score 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Stated Score2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cand. Black -0.092*** -0.125*** -0.087***
(0.029) (0.041) (0.031)
Attractive. -0.004 0.012 -0.026
(0.026) (0.038) (0.035)
Intelligence 0.023 0.105** -0.092**
(0.037) (0.052) (0.044)
Closeness -0.029** -0.007 -0.038***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.010)
Prop. Black 0.055 0.116 0.086
(0.056) (0.097) (0.079)
Controls Size Size Size
Observations 611 408 203
Xmfx y 0.154 0.186 0.116
N clust 114 74 40
ll -247.0 -159.8 -78.83
chi2 153.5 123.0 54.27
r2 p 0.156 0.166 0.218
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Errors clustered on Individual (Employer/Selector)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Hiring By Picture + Real Score
(1) (2) (3)
Hired Hired by White Hired by Non-White
Real Score 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Cand. Black -0.072*** -0.093*** -0.029
(0.026) (0.030) (0.040)
Attractive. -0.000 0.006 -0.017
(0.024) (0.031) (0.031)
Intelligence -0.062* -0.053 -0.049
(0.034) (0.042) (0.049)
Closeness -0.023** -0.004 -0.031***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.008)
Prop. Black 0.088* 0.129* 0.023
(0.053) (0.077) (0.059)
Controls Size Size Size
Observations 611 408 203
Xmfx y 0.134 0.142 0.0901
N clust 114 74 40
ll -226.6 -148.6 -75.57
chi2 87.66 66.40 28.65
r2 p 0.225 0.224 0.250
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Errors clustered on Individual (Employer/Selector)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Racism in Stated Score and Picture
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Figure 2: Racism In Real and Picture Round
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